Layer 2 Switch Security Requirements Guide

Overview

Version	Date	Finding Count (27)			Downloads
1	2019-01-07 2018-05-22 2019-07-03 2019-12-12 2020-03-06 2020-03-06 2020-03-06 2020-03-06 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2021-05-17	CAT I (High): 0	CAT II (Med): 27	CAT III (Low): 0	Excel	JSON	XML

STIG Description
This Security Requirements Guide is published as a tool to improve the security of Department of Defense (DoD) information systems. The requirements are derived from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-53 and related documents. Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via e-mail to the following address: disa.stig_spt@mail.mil.

Available Profiles

Classified	Public	Sensitive
I - Mission Critical Classified	I - Mission Critical Public	I - Mission Critical Sensitive	II - Mission Support Classified	II - Mission Support Public	II - Mission Support Sensitive	III - Administrative Classified	III - Administrative Public	III - Administrative Sensitive

Findings (MAC III - Administrative Sensitive)

Finding ID	Severity	Title	Description
V-62195	Medium	The layer 2 switch must enable Unidirectional Link Detection (UDLD) to protect against one-way connections.	In topologies where fiber optic interconnections are used, physical misconnections can occur that allow a link to appear to be up when there is a mismatched set of transmit/receive pairs. When...
V-62197	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have all trunk links enabled statically.	When trunk negotiation is enabled via Dynamic Trunk Protocol (DTP), considerable time can be spent negotiating trunk settings (802.1q or ISL) when a node or interface is restored. While this...
V-62193	Medium	The layer 2 switch must implement Rapid STP where VLANs span multiple switches with redundant links.	Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is implemented on bridges and switches to prevent layer 2 loops when a broadcast domain spans multiple bridges and switches and when redundant links are provisioned to...
V-62199	Medium	The layer 2 switch must only allow a maximum of one registered MAC address per each user-facing or untrusted access port.	Limiting the number of registered MAC addresses on a switch access port can help prevent a Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table overflow attack. This type of attack lets an attacker exploit the...
V-62169	Medium	The layer 2 switch must provide the capability for authorized users to remotely view, in real time, all content related to an established user session from a component separate from the layer 2 switch.	Without the capability to remotely view/hear all content related to a user session, investigations into suspicious user activity would be hampered. Real-time monitoring allows authorized personnel...
V-62065	Medium	The layer 2 switch must be configured to disable non-essential capabilities.	A compromised switch introduces risk to the entire network infrastructure as well as data resources that are accessible via the network. The perimeter defense has no oversight or control of...
V-62165	Medium	The layer 2 switch must fail to a secure state if system initialization fails, shutdown fails, or aborts fail.	Failure to a known safe state helps prevent systems from failing to a state that may cause loss of data or unauthorized access to system resources. Network elements that fail suddenly and with no...
V-62167	Medium	The layer 2 switch must provide the capability for authorized users to select a user session to capture.	Without the capability to select a user session to capture/record or view/hear, investigations into suspicious or harmful events would be hampered by the volume of information captured. The volume...
V-62161	Medium	The layer 2 switch must authenticate all VLAN Trunk Protocol (VTP) messages with a hash function using the most secured cryptographic algorithm available.	VLAN Trunk Protocol (VTP) provides central management of VLAN domains, thus reducing administration in a switched network. When configuring a new VLAN on a VTP server, the VLAN is distributed...
V-62163	Medium	The layer 2 switch must manage excess bandwidth to limit the effects of packet flooding types of denial of service (DoS) attacks.	Denial of service is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. Packet flooding DDoS attacks are referred to as volumetric attacks and have the objective of overloading a...
V-62213	Medium	The layer 2 switch must not have any access to switch ports assigned to the native VLAN.	Double encapsulation can be initiated by an attacker who has access to a switch port belonging to the native VLAN of the trunk port. Knowing the victim’s MAC address and with the victim attached...
V-62211	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have the native VLAN assigned to an ID other than the default VLAN for all 802.1q trunk links.	VLAN hopping can be initiated by an attacker who has access to a switch port belonging to the same VLAN as the native VLAN of the trunk link connecting to another switch that the victim is...
V-62185	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have Dynamic Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Inspection (DAI) enabled on all user VLANs.	DAI intercepts Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests and verifies that each of these packets has a valid IP-to-MAC address binding before updating the local ARP cache and before forwarding...
V-62183	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have IP Source Guard enabled on all user-facing or untrusted access switch ports.	IP Source Guard provides source IP address filtering on a Layer 2 port to prevent a malicious host from impersonating a legitimate host by assuming the legitimate host's IP address. The feature...
V-62181	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have DHCP snooping for all user VLANs to validate DHCP messages from untrusted sources as well as rate-limit DHCP traffic.	In an enterprise network, devices under administrative control are trusted sources. These devices include the switches, routers, and servers in the network. Host ports and unknown DHCP servers are...
V-62179	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have Unknown Unicast Flood Blocking (UUFB) enabled.	Access layer switches use the Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table to direct traffic to specific ports based on the VLAN number and the destination MAC address of the frame. When a router has an...
V-62155	Medium	The layer 2 switch must uniquely identify all network-connected endpoint devices before establishing any connection.	Controlling LAN access via 802.1x authentication can assist in preventing a malicious user from connecting an unauthorized PC to a switch port to inject or receive data from the network without detection.
V-62157	Medium	The layer 2 switch must authenticate all endpoint devices before establishing a network connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.	Controlling LAN access via 802.1x authentication can assist in preventing a malicious user from connecting an unauthorized PC to a switch port to inject or receive data from the network without detection.
V-62173	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have Root Guard enabled on all ports where the root bridge should not appear.	Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) does not provide any means for the network administrator to securely enforce the topology of the switched network. Any switch can be the root bridge in a network....
V-62171	Medium	The layer 2 switch must authenticate all network-connected endpoint devices before establishing any connection.	Without authenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures),...
V-62177	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have STP Loop Guard enabled on all non-designated STP switch ports.	The Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) loop guard feature provides additional protection against STP loops. An STP loop is created when an STP blocking port in a redundant topology erroneously...
V-62175	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have BPDU Guard enabled on all user-facing or untrusted access switch ports.	If a rogue switch is introduced into the topology and transmits a Bridge Protocol Data Unit (BPDU) with a lower bridge priority than the existing root bridge, it will become the new root bridge...
V-62205	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have the default VLAN pruned from all trunk ports that do not require it.	The default VLAN (i.e., VLAN 1) is a special VLAN used for control plane traffic such as Spanning-Tree Protocol (STP), Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP), VLAN Trunking Protocol (VTP), and Port...
V-62207	Medium	The layer 2 switch must not use the default VLAN for management traffic.	Switches use the default VLAN (i.e., VLAN 1) for in-band management and to communicate with directly connected switches using Spanning-Tree Protocol (STP), Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP), VLAN...
V-62201	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have all disabled switch ports assigned to an unused VLAN.	It is possible that a disabled port that is assigned to a user or management VLAN becomes enabled by accident or by an attacker and as a result gains access to that VLAN as a member.
V-62203	Medium	The layer 2 switch must not have the default VLAN assigned to any host-facing switch ports.	In a VLAN-based network, switches use the default VLAN (i.e., VLAN 1) for in-band management and to communicate with other networking devices using Spanning-Tree Protocol (STP), Dynamic Trunking...
V-62209	Medium	The layer 2 switch must have all user-facing or untrusted ports configured as access switch ports.	Double encapsulation can be initiated by an attacker who has access to a switch port belonging to the native VLAN of the trunk port. Knowing the victim's MAC address and with the victim attached...