| V-259350 | High | The Windows DNS Server must be configured to enable DNSSEC Resource Records (RRs). | The specification for a digital signature mechanism in the context of the DNS infrastructure is in the Internet Engineering Task Force's (IETF's) DNSSEC standard. In DNSSEC, trust in the public... |
| V-259397 | High | The Windows DNS Server must protect the integrity of transmitted information. | Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality and integrity may be compromised because unprotected communications can be intercepted and either read or altered.
Communication... |
| V-259347 | High | The Windows DNS Server's zone files must have NS records that point to active name servers authoritative for the domain specified in that record. | Poorly constructed NS records pose a security risk because they create conditions under which an adversary might be able to provide the missing authoritative name services that are improperly... |
| V-259343 | High | The Windows DNS Server with a caching name server role must restrict recursive query responses to only the IP addresses and IP address ranges of known supported clients. | A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-IP address mappings from bogus name servers... |
| V-259390 | High | The Windows DNS Server must protect the authenticity of dynamic updates via transaction signing. | DNS is a fundamental network service that is prone to various attacks, such as cache poisoning and man-in-the middle attacks. If communication sessions are not provided appropriate validity... |
| V-259376 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must use DNSSEC data within queries to confirm data origin to DNS resolvers. | The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures is the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data... |
| V-259374 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server's IP address must be statically defined and configured locally on the server. | The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures is the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data... |
| V-259379 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must be configured with the Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Records (RR) carrying the signature for the RR that contains the public key of the child zone. | If name server replies are invalid or cannot be validated, many networking functions and communication would be adversely affected. With DNS, the presence of DS records associated with child zones... |
| V-259378 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must use DNSSEC data within queries to confirm data integrity to DNS resolvers. | The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures is the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data... |
| V-259373 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must include data origin with authoritative data the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries. | The underlying feature in the major threat associated with DNS query/response (i.e., forged response or response failure) is the integrity of DNS data returned in the response. The security... |
| V-259399 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must maintain the integrity of information during reception. | Information can be unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during preparation for transmission, including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and... |
| V-259372 | Medium | The salt value for zones signed using NSEC3 resource records (RRs) must be changed every time the zone is completely re-signed. | NSEC records list the resource record types for the name, as well as the name of the next resource record. With this information it is revealed that the resource record type for the name queried,... |
| V-259414 | Medium | The private keys corresponding to both the zone signing key (ZSK) and the key signing key (KSK) must not be kept on the DNSSEC-aware primary authoritative name server when the name server does not support dynamic updates. | The private keys in the KSK and ZSK key pairs must be protected from unauthorized access. If possible, the private keys should be stored offline (with respect to the internet-facing, DNSSEC-aware... |
| V-259381 | Medium | The Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) must be configured in Group Policy to enforce clients to request DNSSEC validation for a domain. | The NRPT is used to require DNSSEC validation. The NRPT can be configured in local Group Policy for a single computer or domain Group Policy for some or all computers in the domain. |
| V-259416 | Medium | In a split DNS configuration, where separate name servers are used between the external and internal networks, the internal name server must be configured to not be reachable from outside resolvers. | Instead of having the same set of authoritative name servers serve different types of clients, an enterprise could have two different sets of authoritative name servers.
One set, called external... |
| V-259417 | Medium | Windows DNS response rate limiting (RRL) must be enabled. | This setting can prevent someone from sending a denial-of-service attack using the DNS servers. For instance, a bot net can send requests to the DNS server using the IP address of a third computer... |
| V-259384 | Medium | Automatic Update of Trust Anchors must be enabled on key rollover. | A trust anchor is a preconfigured public key associated with a specific zone. A validating DNS server must be configured with one or more trust anchors to perform validation. If the DNS server is... |
| V-259411 | Medium | The DNS server implementation must employ strong authenticators in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions. | If unauthorized personnel use maintenance tools, they may accidentally or intentionally damage or compromise the system. The act of managing systems and applications includes the ability to access... |
| V-259412 | Medium | In the event of a system failure, the Windows DNS Server must preserve any information necessary to determine cause of failure and any information necessary to return to operations with least disruption to mission processes. | Failure to a known state can address safety or security in accordance with the mission/business needs of the organization. Failure to a known secure state helps prevent a loss of confidentiality,... |
| V-259387 | Medium | The Windows DNS secondary server must validate data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses received from primary name servers. | If data origin authentication and data integrity verification are not performed, the resultant response could be forged, it may have come from a poisoned cache, the packets could have been... |
| V-259388 | Medium | The Windows DNS secondary server must validate data origin verification authentication on the name/address resolution responses received from primary name servers. | If data origin authentication and data integrity verification are not performed, the resultant response could be forged, it may have come from a poisoned cache, the packets could have been... |
| V-259389 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must protect the authenticity of zone transfers via transaction signing. | Without identifying devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. This applies to server-to-server (zone transfer) transactions and is... |
| V-259360 | Medium | Nonroutable IPv6 link-local scope addresses must not be configured in any zone. | IPv6 link-local scope addresses are not globally routable and must not be configured in any DNS zone. Like RFC1918 addresses, if a link-local scope address is inserted into a zone provided to... |
| V-259361 | Medium | AAAA addresses must not be configured in a zone for hosts that are not IPv6 aware. | DNS is only responsible for resolving a domain name to an IP address. Applications and operating systems are responsible for processing the IPv6 or IPv4 record that may be returned.
A denial of... |
| V-259366 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must provide its identity with returned DNS information by enabling DNSSEC and TSIG/SIG(0). | Weakly bound credentials can be modified without invalidating the credential; therefore, nonrepudiation can be violated.
This requirement supports audit requirements that provide organizational... |
| V-259367 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must be configured to enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key. | The cornerstone of the PKI is the private key used to encrypt or digitally sign information. If the private key is stolen, this will lead to the compromise of the authentication and nonrepudiation... |
| V-259364 | Medium | The secondary Windows DNS name servers must cryptographically authenticate zone transfers from primary name servers. | Authenticity of zone transfers within Windows Active Directory (AD)-integrated zones is accomplished by AD replication. Without authenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be... |
| V-259365 | Medium | The Windows DNS primary server must only send zone transfers to a specific list of secondary name servers. | Primary name servers also make outbound connection to secondary name servers to provide zone transfers and accept inbound connection requests from clients wishing to provide a dynamic update.... |
| V-259344 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must implement cryptographic mechanisms to detect changes to information during transmission. | Encrypting information for transmission protects it from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Cryptographic mechanisms implemented to protect information integrity include, for example,... |
| V-259345 | Medium | The validity period for the Resource Record Signatures (RRSIGs) covering a zone's DNSKEY RRSet must be no less than two days and no more than one week. | The best way for a zone administrator to minimize the impact of a key compromise is by limiting the validity period of RRSIGs in the zone and the parent zone. This strategy limits the time during... |
| V-259346 | Medium | NSEC3 must be used for all internal DNS zones. | NSEC records list the resource record types for the name, as well as the name of the next resource record. This information reveals that the resource record type for the name queried, or the... |
| V-259340 | Medium | The Windows DNS name servers for a zone must be geographically dispersed. | In addition to network-based separation, authoritative name servers should be dispersed geographically. In other words, in addition to being located on different network segments, the... |
| V-259341 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must prohibit recursion on authoritative name servers for which forwarders have not been configured for external queries. | A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-IP address mappings from bogus name servers... |
| V-259342 | Medium | Forwarders on an authoritative Windows DNS Server, if enabled for external resolution, must forward only to an internal, non-Active Directory (AD)-integrated DNS server or to the DOD Enterprise Recursive Services (ERS). | A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-IP address mappings from bogus name servers... |
| V-259353 | Medium | In a split DNS configuration between the external and internal networks, the external name server must be configured to not be reachable from inside resolvers. | Instead of having the same set of authoritative name servers serve different types of clients, an enterprise could have two different sets of authoritative name servers.
One set, called external... |
| V-259348 | Medium | All authoritative name servers for a zone must be located on different network segments. | Most enterprises have an authoritative primary server and a host of authoritative secondary name servers. It is essential that these authoritative name servers for an enterprise be located on... |
| V-259349 | Medium | All authoritative name servers for a zone must have the same version of zone information. | The only protection approach for content control of a DNS zone file is the use of a zone file integrity checker. The effectiveness of integrity checking using a zone file integrity checker depends... |
| V-259382 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must be configured to validate an authentication chain of parent and child domains via response data. | If name server replies are invalid or cannot be validated, many networking functions and communication would be adversely affected. With DNS, the presence of Delegation Signer (DS) records... |
| V-259392 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must use an approved DOD PKI certificate authority. | Untrusted certificate authorities (CA) can issue certificates, but the certificates may be issued by organizations or individuals that seek to compromise DOD systems or by organizations with... |
| V-259380 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must enforce approved authorizations between DNS servers using digital signatures in the Resource Record Set (RRSet). | A mechanism to detect and prevent unauthorized communication flow must be configured or provided as part of the system design. If information flow is not enforced based on approved authorizations,... |
| V-259393 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must protect secret/private cryptographic keys while at rest. | Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on a secondary storage device within an organizational information system. Mobile devices, laptops, desktops, and storage... |
| V-259351 | Medium | The digital signature algorithm used for DNSSEC-enabled zones must be FIPS-compatible. | The choice of digital signature algorithm will be based on recommended algorithms in well-known standards. NIST's Digital Signature Standard (DSS) (FIPS186) provides three algorithm choices:
-... |
| V-259415 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server audit records must be backed up at least every seven days onto a different system or system component than the system or component being audited. | Protection of log data includes ensuring log data is not accidentally lost or deleted. Backing up audit records to a different system or onto media separate from the system being audited on a... |
| V-259336 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must notify the DNS administrator in the event of an error validating another DNS server's identity. | Failing to act on validation errors may result in the use of invalid, corrupted, or compromised information. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example, using cryptographic checksums.... |
| V-259368 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server key file must be owned by the account under which the Windows DNS Server service is run. | To enable zone transfer (requests and responses) through authenticated messages, it is necessary to generate a key for every pair of name servers. The key can also be used for securing other... |
| V-259352 | Medium | For zones split between the external and internal sides of a network, the resource records (RRs) for the external hosts must be separate from the RRs for the internal hosts. | Authoritative name servers for an enterprise may be configured to receive requests from both external and internal clients.
External clients need to receive RRs that pertain only to public... |
| V-259402 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must follow procedures to re-role a secondary name server as the primary name server if the primary name server permanently loses functionality. | Failing to an unsecure condition negatively impacts application security and can lead to system compromise. Failure conditions include, for example, loss of communications among critical system... |
| V-259369 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server permissions must be set so the key file can only be read or modified by the account that runs the name server software. | To enable zone transfer (requests and responses) through authenticated messages, it is necessary to generate a key for every pair of name servers. The key can also be used for securing other... |
| V-259395 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must restrict individuals from using it for launching denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against other information systems. | Applications and application developers must take steps to ensure users cannot use an authorized application to launch DoS attacks against other systems and networks. For example, applications may... |
| V-259410 | Medium | A unique Transaction Signature (TSIG) key must be generated for each pair of communicating hosts. | To enable zone transfer (requests and responses) through authenticated messages, it is necessary to generate a key for every pair of name servers. The key also can be used for securing other... |
| V-259391 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must protect the authenticity of query responses via DNSSEC. | The underlying feature in the major threat associated with DNS query/response (i.e., forged response or response failure) is the integrity of DNS data returned in the response. An integral part of... |
| V-259354 | Medium | Primary authoritative name servers must be configured to only receive zone transfer requests from specified secondary name servers. | Authoritative name servers (especially primary name servers) should be configured with an allow-transfer access control substatement designating the list of hosts from which zone transfer requests... |
| V-259385 | Medium | The Windows DNS secondary servers must request data origin authentication verification from the primary server when requesting name/address resolution. | If data origin authentication and data integrity verification are not performed, the resultant response could be forged, it may have come from a poisoned cache, the packets could have been... |
| V-259407 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must verify the correct operation of security functions upon system startup and/or restart, upon command by a user with privileged access, and/or every 30 days. | Security function is defined as the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data... |
| V-259406 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must verify the correct operation of security functions upon startup and/or restart, upon command by a user with privileged access, and/or every 30 days. | Security function is defined as the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data... |
| V-259405 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must, when a component failure is detected, activate a notification to the system administrator. | Predictable failure prevention requires organizational planning to address system failure issues. If components key to maintaining systems security fail to function, the system could continue... |
| V-259404 | Medium | The HINFO, RP, TXT, and LOC RR types must not be used in the zone SOA. | Several types of resource records (RRs) in the DNS are meant to convey information to humans and applications about the network, hosts, or services. These RRs include the Responsible Person (RP)... |
| V-259403 | Medium | The DNS Name Server software must be configured to refuse queries for its version information. | Each newer version of the name server software, especially the BIND software, generally is devoid of vulnerabilities found in earlier versions because it has design changes incorporated to address... |
| V-259386 | Medium | The Windows DNS secondary server must request data integrity verification from the primary server when requesting name/address resolution. | If data origin authentication and data integrity verification are not performed, the resultant response could be forged, it may have come from a poisoned cache, the packets could have been... |
| V-259401 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must be configured to only allow zone information that reflects the environment for which it is authoritative, including IP ranges and IP versions. | DNS zone data for which a Windows DNS Server is authoritative should represent the network for which it is responsible. If a Windows DNS Server hosts zone records for other networks or... |
| V-259400 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must implement NIST FIPS-validated cryptography for provisioning digital signatures, generating cryptographic hashes, and protecting unclassified information requiring confidentiality. | Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of using encryption to protect data. The application must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards... |
| V-259375 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must return data information in response to internal name/address resolution queries. | The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures is the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data... |
| V-259383 | Medium | Trust anchors must be exported from authoritative Windows DNS Servers and distributed to validating Windows DNS Servers. | If name server replies are invalid or cannot be validated, many networking functions and communication would be adversely affected. With DNS, the presence of Delegation Signer (DS) records... |
| V-259377 | Medium | WINS lookups must be disabled on the Windows DNS Server. | The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures is the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data... |
| V-259398 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must maintain the integrity of information during preparation for transmission. | Information can be unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during preparation for transmission, including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and... |
| V-259371 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must implement a local cache of revocation data for PKI authentication. | Not configuring a local cache of revocation data could allow access to users who are no longer authorized (users with revoked certificates).
SIG(0) is used for server-to-server authentication for... |
| V-259370 | Medium | The private key corresponding to the zone signing key (ZSK) must only be stored on the name server that does support dynamic updates. | The private keys in the key signing key (KSK) and ZSK key pairs must be protected from unauthorized access. If possible, the private keys should be stored offline (with respect to the... |
| V-259409 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must be configured to notify the information system security officer (ISSO), information system security manager (ISSM), or DNS administrator when functionality of DNSSEC/TSIG has been removed or broken. | Security function is defined as the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data... |
| V-259408 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must log the event and notify the system administrator when anomalies in the operation of the signed zone transfers are discovered. | Security function is defined as the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data... |
| V-259357 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server authoritative for local zones must only point root hints to the DNS servers that host the internal root domain. | All caching name servers must be authoritative for the root zone because, without this starting point, they would have no knowledge of the DNS infrastructure and thus would be unable to respond to... |
| V-259356 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must implement internal/external role separation. | DNS servers with an internal role only process name/address resolution requests from within the organization (i.e., internal clients). DNS servers with an external role only process name/address... |
| V-259355 | Medium | The Windows DNS Servers zone database files must not be accessible for edit/write by users and/or processes other than the Windows DNS Server service account and/or the DNS database administrator. | Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is based on the premise that individual users are "owners" of objects and therefore have discretion over who should be authorized to access the object and in... |
| V-259394 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must only contain zone records that have been validated annually. | If zone information has not been validated in more than a year, there is no assurance that it is still valid. If invalid records are in a zone, an adversary could potentially use their existence... |
| V-259335 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must be configured to record who added/modified/deleted DNS zone information. | Without a means for identifying the individual that produced the information, the information cannot be relied on. Identifying the validity of information may be delayed or deterred.
This... |
| V-259334 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must restrict incoming dynamic update requests to known clients. | Limiting the number of concurrent sessions reduces the risk of denial of service (DoS) on any system.
A DNS server's function requires it to be able to handle multiple sessions at a time, so... |
| V-259337 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server log must be enabled. | Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The... |
| V-259363 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must uniquely identify the other DNS server before responding to a server-to-server transaction. | Without identifying devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. This applies to server-to-server (zone transfer) transactions only and is... |
| V-259339 | Medium | The validity period for the Resource Record Signatures (RRSIGs) covering the Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) for a zone's delegated children must be no less than two days and no more than one week. | The best way for a zone administrator to minimize the impact of a key compromise is by limiting the validity period of RRSIGs in the zone and the parent zone. This strategy limits the time during... |
| V-259338 | Medium | The "Manage auditing and security log" user right must be assigned only to authorized personnel. | Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The... |
| V-259396 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server must use DNS Notify to prevent denial of service (DoS) through increase in workload. | In the case of application DoS attacks, care must be taken when designing the application to ensure it makes the best use of system resources. SQL queries have the potential to consume large... |
| V-259413 | Medium | The DNS Name Server software must run with restricted privileges. | Failure to provide logical access restrictions associated with changes to application configuration may have significant effects on the overall security of the system. When dealing with access... |
| V-259359 | Medium | The Windows DNS Server's zone files must not include CNAME records pointing to a zone with lesser security for more than six months. | The use of CNAME records for exercises, tests, or zone-spanning (pointing to zones with lesser security) aliases should be temporary (e.g., to facilitate a migration) and not be in place for more... |
| V-259358 | Medium | The Windows DNS Servers zone files must not include resource records that resolve to a fully qualified domain name residing in another zone. | If a name server could claim authority for a resource record in a domain for which it was not authoritative, this would pose a security risk. In this environment, an adversary could use illicit... |
